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Abstract: A type of causal meaning that has so far received little attention in pragmatic 
research is that of ‘metacommunicative’  cause introduced by Kalokerinos (2004). In 
fact, the specific notion has been explicated in terms of the causal marker γiati picking 
up “elements of the communicative setting to justify not an illocutionary act but a 
higher-order act of communication” (Kalokerinos 2004: 37). We will argue that the 
view of metacommunicative aspects of meaning is wanting in two important respects 
for rigorous descriptions of causality. For one thing, it seems to be insensitive to 
linguistic underspecificity considerations. Moreover, we will argue that the notion at 
hand appears underdefined and, in this light, is not expected to constitute a constant 
point of reference in prospective accounts of relevant causal data. Ultimately, we will 
put forward the claim that all cases thought of as metacommunicative are analyzable in 
the procedural terms stipulated in relevance theory at no extra cost. In the same vein, 
cases of underspecification are accounted for procedurally, too, in an economical 
fashion.        
Key words: metacommunicative cause, relevance, procedural meaning, interpretive 
resemblance. 
 
 
0. Introduction  
One of the classes of causal encoding was only recently identified as a means of causal 
expression (Kalokerinos 2004). The type of expression at issue has been labeled 
‘metacommunicative’ or ‘metamodal’ and seems to have received little attention up to 
now in pragmatic analysis.  
Kalokerinos has described metacommunicative operation in terms of a causal marker 
used to pick up “elements of the communicative setting to justify not an illocutionary 
act but a higher-order act of communication” (37). For instance, γiati in (1) below 
marks a justification of the repetition of an illocutionary act, rather than the 
illocutionary act being repeated.   
 
(1) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπάει, γιατί δεν το άκουσες. 
 John loves her, because you didn’t hear it. [Kalokerinos 2004: 37] 
 
Moreover, a number of subclasses of the notion under investigation have been 
distinguished, as we will see.  
We would like to argue that the model of meaning description proposed for 
classifying data as a special case of causality, i.e. metacommunicative, fails in two 
interrelated respects: observing the prospective role of semantic under-specificity in 
fine-tuning metacommunicative interpretation and, also, resulting in a profligate, but 
most importantly, ad hoc characterization of the particular notion. Both defects are 
taken to impact the reliability of the criterion set up for a rigorous definition of 
‘metacausality’.    
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Instead, we will argue in favor of a relevance theoretic approach in view of a unified 
and, therefore, more economical account on procedural grounds (Blakemore 1987). In 
this light, we will avail ourselves of the opportunity to determine the sensitivity 
demonstrated by the model employed in describing the sort of causal meaning under 
discussion, our orientation towards economy notwithstanding.       
 
1. Kalokerionos’s scheme 
Kalokerinos’s (2004:37) classification of causal conjunctions can be schematized in the 
following table:  
 
Table 1 
Non-modal Modal Metamodal 
 EPISTEMIC 
NON-EPISTEMIC 
‘saying that’   ‘saying how’ 
 
Non-modal connections relate the contents of two propositions, in correlation to the 
Sweetserean (1990) lines of content reading, as with (2) below. By contrast, Sweetser’s 
epistemic (3) and speech act (4) causal instances represent non-propositional modal 
expression, in that here because fulfils the role of a discourse -rather than sentence- 
connective accessing intentional attitudes or illocutionary forces.      
 
(2) John came back because he loved her. 
(3) John loved her because he came back.  
(4) What are you doing tonight, because there is a good movie on.  
 [Sweetser 1990: 77] 
 
As evidenced, a disparity between epistemic and non-epistemic, or speech act 
interpretation is maintained in the modal category given that “epistemic modality (as far 
as belief is concerned) appears to enjoy a special status in discourse sequencing” 
(Kalokerinos 2004: 36).    
Now, the class of causal meaning left to discuss is that of metacommunicative 
encoding, that is the type of encoding singled out for exposition in this paper. We will 
now turn to a relevant discussion.              
 
2. Definition of metacommunicative cause  
In Kalokerinos’s terms, metacommunicative instances of causal expression are  
 
[…] cases where both content and intentional attitude are ‘invisible’ to the import of DC-SS 
[subordinator]. These focus exclusively on the situation of communication and pick up elements 
of the communicative setting to justify not an illocutionary act but a higher-order act of 
communication, as in (1) above (2004:37).    
 
However, he also makes the following addition:  
 
As a matter of fact, there is one step further that a causal DC [discourse connective] can take, 
namely comment on and justify etic aspects of the communicative act (2004: 37).  
 
Such a function is demonstrated in the following example:  
 
(5) ΠΗΓΑΙΝΕ! Γιατί πρέπει να φωνάζουμε εδώ πέρα. 
GO! Because we have to shout in this place.  [Kalokerinos 2004: 37]  
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On account of this distinguishing meaning feature, cases like (1) and (5) represent a 
distinct type of cause, which is not to be treated along modal or non-modal lines of 
interpretation.      
 
3. Types of metacommunicative cause 
Kalokerinos lists the following utterances as instances of metacommunicative cause, 
apart from (1). Example (5) is being repeated here as (7), for convenience.  
 
(6) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. Γιατί πρέπει να το ξέρεις. 
John loves her, because you have to know.  
 
(7) ΠΗΓΑΙΝΕ! Γιατί πρέπει να φωνάζουμε εδώ πέρα. 
GO! Because we have to shout in this place. 
 
(8) Μετάνιωσα που τον σκότωσα – γιατί τον σκότωσα.  
I regret killing him – ‘cos I did kill him.1 
 
(9) Ο φίλος μου – γιατί μόνο έναν φίλο έχω – ερχόταν καθημερινά να με δει. 
My friend –‘cos I’ve only got one friend – came to see me every day.  
 [Kalokerinos 2004: 49-50] 
 
Thus, (1) and (6) seem to draw on elements of the communicative setting in 
expressing metacommunicative or metamodal meaning, while (7) incorporates etic 
aspects of the communicative act. On the other hand, the causal relation in (8) performs 
a metacommunicative task on account of “rendering explicit a presupposed part of its 
content”2 (2004: 49). Finally, the ‘metacausal’ sense of the γiati-introduced clause in (9) 
is ascribed to the “justificatory commentary” (2004: 49) presented as informative by 
itself.    
This range of applications already raises an evident query as to a coherent explication 
of the above-mentioned conjunctions relative to the stipulations regulating the defining 
properties of the notion under discussion. More specifically, it is not clear whether a 
case of explicated presupposition, as in (8), or that of commenting on the presupposed 
information carried by a lexical constituent contained in the main clause, as in (9), can 
be studied in alignment with the rest of the cases.  
This diversity of cases is taken to have non-trivial implications in setting up hard-
and-fast criteria for identifying metacommunicative relations in a homogeneous 
category of causal meaning. But in such a case, inclusion criteria are inevitably under 
indefinite and ad hoc revision and an ensuing classification such as the one offered 
above turns out to be open-ended.  
Moreover, inasmuch as the notional category at hand comprises disparate causal 
phenomena, which are not readily explained by way of the defining specifications of 
‘metacommunication’ proposed, the method of analysis discussed here is faced with the 
challenge of descriptive rigor.  
                                                 
1 Kalokerinos’s choice of ‘cos as the translation counterpart of Modern Greek γiati is seen as an attempt at 
a more natural-sounding rendering of several of the ‘metacommunicative’ instances (cf. Kalokerinos 
2004). 
2 An account in terms of presupposition does not follow from the specifications of metacommunicative 
interpretation offered above. However this may be, we intend to take account of this suggestion as well in 
shaping our arguments.    
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In what follows we will discuss a second problem undermining the predictive 
potential of the definition of metacommunicative cause.  
 
4. Semantic under-determinacy   
Recent pragmatic research has acknowledged the role of under-determinacy resolution 
in inferential accounts. Referential indeterminacy, semantic ambiguity and further types 
of inferential adjustment (Carston 2002) are pragmatic tasks undertaken to bridge the 
gap between the logical form of a sentence and the speaker’s informative intention. It is 
this hybrid form of linguistically determined and contextually supplied aspects of 
meaning that yields the speaker’s intended interpretation.  
Semantic under-determinacy issues have been discussed at length in the relevance-
theoretic framework. Such issues are taken to be resolved through an inferential process 
of explicating unarticulated elements of a sentence, a process leading to the 
development of the semantic representation of a linguistic structure to a complete 
interpretation of an utterance in context.  
Granted the indisputable contribution of pragmatic import to the development of 
logical form to a fully-fledged assumption, it is rather surprising that issues of under-
specificity are invisible to Kalokerinos’s postulations. In fact, it has been shown in the 
field of causality, that the realization of causal conjunctions may be a matter of the 
adverbial conjunct hinging on, and thus, pragmatically augmenting aspects of the 
logical form of the matrix clause (Bardzokas 2009). This observation also seems to have 
a bearing on licensing the use of γiati, rather than epeiδi, to mark such non-propositional 
causal connections in Modern Greek discourse (Kitis 1997/2006, Kalokerinos 2004). To 
illustrate, take example (10): 
 
(10) Τελικά, βρήκε γυναίκα, γιατί /*επειδή και οι δυο είναι σε ηλικία γάμου. 
He found a woman, after all, (be)’cause both of them at the right age for marriage, 
too.  
 
In this loose use of (10) the focal lexical concept that undergoes pragmatic adjustment is 
‘woman’. The specific concept is narrowed to that of a young, straight woman who is 
eligible for marriage, by way of on line concept construction (Carston 2002).  This case 
does not seem to fall into the so-called metacommunicative category, in the sense that it 
does not appear to receive a reading along the lines of higher-order elements of the 
communicative setting or etic aspects of the communicative act.  
Another example comes from Kitis’s data.  
    
(11) Είχαμε, δηλαδή, τη χειρότερη θέα, γιατί η καλύτερη έβλεπε προς τη Αγία Σοφία. 
We had, that is, the worst view, because the best view was over St. Sophia.   
 [Kitis 1997/2006:238] 
 
In this case, the subordinate clause is taken to guide the hearer inferentially to the 
intended interpretation of the adjectival predicate ‘worst’ in comparative rather than 
superlative terms. As with (10), this non-propositional case does not succeed in 
satisfying the definition of metacommunicative causal links, despite the availability of 
the ‘saying that’ phraseology option. 
In Kalokerinos’s defense, the causal interpretation of both (10) and (11) do not seem 
to depend on retrieving intentional attitudes. Nonetheless, they do not seem to qualify 
for the category of metacommunicative cause on the basis of retrieving higher-order 
aspects of communication, either.  
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We are, thus, left with the remaining option of examining examples (10) – (11) 
against the tacit suggestion that metacommunicative readings may consist in explicating 
presupposed information. At first sight, this line of speculation seems plausible. On the 
other hand, failure in this attempt would preclude the inclusion of the examples at issue 
in the metamodal class. This, in turn, would undermine the operability of Kalokerinos’s 
project (table 1), with the proviso that these examples do not fall into the modal or non-
modal planes of discourse, either.   
To assess this latter claim we will consider examples (10) and (11) in contrast to (8) 
or even (9), which are viewed as reflecting a presupposition-explicating construction. 
Upon a closer investigation it transpires that the former conjunctions depart from the 
latter. More specifically, while the former appear to condition the senses of lexical 
constituents in their main clauses, the latter are taken to serve as interposing additional 
information that results from a presumed requirement for clarification on the part of the 
speaker. In this sense, the concept encoded in friend does not seem subject to 
adjustment. Rather, it seems that the because-introduced clause offers elaboration 
independently of an otherwise fixed sense attached to the particular word.       
We have already indicated that under-specificity issues are disregarded in 
Kalokerinos’s model of describing causality, in general, or ‘metacausality’, in 
particular. We are now ready to advance our critique with respect to what seems like an 
additional defining property of metacommunicative cause, that of presupposition. 
 
5. Under-defined notion of presupposition 
We have already made a point of the heterogeneity of the category of cause under 
discussion. However, to make matters worse, we assume that even in constricting our 
perspective to an account of rendering explicit presupposed information, we 
unavoidably come across the requirement of adjusting the definition of presupposition 
to accommodate a range of similar but not identical cases.   
 
Consider (12), for instance:   
 
(12) Τα αεροπορικά εισιτήρια κοστίζουν 400 €, γιατί είναι αμφίβολο αν υπάρχει άλλος 
τρόπος να ταξιδέψουμε. 
The plane tickets cost 400 €, ‘cos it’s doubtful that there is another way of 
traveling.  
 
Here, the speaker neither justifies a repetition (1), nor explicates a shared or unshared 
item of presupposed information (8), nor makes a justificatory commentary of a 
previous utterance of the sort in (9). On the contrary, it can be said that the utterance 
framed in the because-introduced clause encodes a speculation offered parenthetically, 
which justifies the speaker’s intention to inform the hearer of the expenses of an 
alternative type of journey. In other words, the speaker intends to share a speculation 
rather than background information.  
On a propositional level (12) would be reflected as in (13) or (14): 
 
(13) Σε πληροφορώ για το p [την τιμή των εισιτηρίων] επειδή/ γιατί αμφιβάλλω αν   
υπάρχει άλλος τρόπος να ταξιδέψουμε. 
I’m informing you that p [the cost of the tickets] because I doubt that there is 
another way of traveling. 
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(14) The reason why I’m informing about the cost of the tickets is because I doubt that 
there is another way of traveling. 
   
Deciding to adhere to the presuppositional grounds of expounding the case of (12), i.e. 
that an item of presupposed information is in doubt, would ultimately involve tackling 
the predicament of reformulating arbitrarily the definition of presupposition against a 
number of differing cases. But the specifics of this undertaking are no foregone 
conclusion.  
Up to now the problems that seem to shake the foundations of the model of causal 
analysis at issue pertain to the following issues:  
 
a) the descriptive rigour of the specific method of analysis 
b) the heterogeneity of the class of metacommunicative meaning  
c) the under-defined notion of presupposition  
d) overlooking the under-determinacy thesis    
 
Based on the aforementioned findings, we would like to offer an alternative account of 
metacommunicative encoding.   
 
6. An alternative account  
In the relevance-theoretic model, discourse connectives have been discussed in terms of 
a major distinction in meaning, i.e. conceptual and procedural. This distinction informs 
the analyst of the propositional or non-propositional effects of the use of a connective in 
the process of interpreting a sequence.  
Traditionally, discourse connectives have been treated in procedural terms 
(Blakemore 2002). Hence, a procedural marker guides the comprehension process so 
that the hearer ends up with the ultimate conceptual representation of an utterance.  
More specifically, it serves to constrain the implicatures derived from deductive 
inference.  
Recent research, however, indicated that procedural encoding can affect explicatures 
in addition to implicatures, to the extent that the recovery of either type of information 
consists in inferential activity. On this account, the distribution of connectives may 
divulge unarticulated higher-order explicatures, i.e. propositional attitudes or speech act 
assumptions (Wilson and Sperber 1993). This latter postulation seems to find 
application in the field of causality (Iten 1997, Takeuchi 1997, Kitis 1997/2006, 
Bardzokas 2009).  
Take Sweetser’s examples (3) and (4). They represent instances of a procedural 
constraint that the causal marker imposes on higher-order assumption schemas. That is, 
the use of the adverbial clause reveals a speech act description into which the 
propositional content of the main clause or the causal utterance as a whole is embedded. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the bounds of procedural encoding should be 
expanded to include constraints to base-order explicatures (Bardzokas 2009), as with 
examples (10) and (11).  
We are now ready to pursue an account of metacommunicative cause along 
procedural lines.  
 
7. Procedural approach       
We surmise that Kalokerinos’s examples (1) and (6) – (9) may all receive a procedural 
interpretation exploiting the notion of higher-order explicatures, despite Kalokerinos’s 
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avowals that determining the interpretation of metacommunicative sequences is not a 
matter of uncovering the speaker’s intentional attitudes. Let us explore this possibility.  
In the best-case scenario, metacommunicative cases display no structural differences 
from Sweetser’s epistemic or speech-act data, which are amenable to a procedural 
analysis, as we have witnessed, as is the case in (1) in comparison with (3). In the worst 
situation, however, it may be argued that a metacommunicative case like (9) represents 
an elliptical conjunction in that the main clause does not seem linguistically encoded 
and, if it is, it cannot be properly encoded as a main clause to the specific subordinate 
clause: ‘cos I’ve only got one friend.  
But how is the meaning representation of the main clause itself determined, if the 
main clause is not properly encoded? Potential differences in structure notwithstanding, 
the hearer can make up for the missing linguistic material making use of linguistic 
resources, which seem to be of two sorts here. Firstly, it seems that the logical form or 
lexical material that undergoes propositional development is traceable to prior 
discourse, i.e. what precedes the occurrence of the subordinate clause: my friend. In the 
second place, the realization of the adverbial clause is justified inasmuch as it accesses a 
speech act interpretation embedding the propositional representation of the unencoded 
main clause. Hence, determining explicit content here is of inter-sentential or discoursal 
nature. 
In this line of interpretation, the utterance in the main clause in (1) is explicated as a 
repetition in favour of the hearer. The explication takes the form of a higher-order 
assumption schema such as I repeat that _____. In a similar vein, the speaker in (6) is 
informing the hearer, while in (8) and (9) the speaker asserts an element of background 
information.  
Finally, by the same token, the speaker’s attitude to the imperative in (7) is one of 
dissociation from the current situation. This information is retrieved by the justification 
for this conduct framed in the subordination. Moreover, apart from the dissociating 
attitude, the prosodic element taken to attach to the use of the imperative conveys 
information about emotions or attitudes (Wilson and Wharton 2006). Also, given that 
prosodic effects are ‘highly context-dependent’ (Wilson and Wharton 2006: 1560) and 
that a speaker’s mental or physical state may affect the prosodic properties of an 
utterance (Wilson and Wharton 2006: 1562), this type of information is taken to be of a 
procedural character.   
But such a view of the metacommunicative domain is allied to our treatment of 
epistemic (3) and speech act cases (4) in terms of integrating the proposition expressed 
in the main clause under the corresponding illocutions. It transpires, then, that while we 
may speak of a distinguishing syntactic or distributional regularity associated with 
metacommunicative cause, a meaning analysis seems to subsume this seemingly 
separate class of encoding on procedural grounds.   
In this light, we may analyse all these examples coherently, at no extra cost, as 
containing semantic constraints on inference and relevance, facilitating the 
comprehension process. We are, therefore, led to the conclusion that we might be better 
off without an additional meaning class whose contribution to causality investigations is 
controversial, due to its indistinctness concomitant of two important drawbacks: 
heterogeneity, on the one hand, and insensitivity to cases which, however, are not 
treated as ‘modal’ or ‘non-modal’, either. 
 
8. More relevance considerations     
Cases of procedural meaning, which, as we said, is pivotal to the analysis of discourse 
connectives, may be examined in parallel to another salient category of representation 
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distinguished by relevance theorists: that of interpretive representation. The relevance of 
interpretive representation to the study of discourse markers lies in determining the 
meaning of non-literal utterances, as in the case of procedural expressions of sequences.  
In the relevance-theoretic framework, there is interpretative representation, or 
representation by resemblance, when an utterance is used to represent another utterance 
that it resembles.  
 
For example, in direct quotation an utterance is used to represent another utterance with which it 
shares linguistic properties; in translation an utterance is used to represent another utterance with 
which it shares semantic properties; in paraphrase an utterance is used to represent another 
utterance with which it shares logical properties – that is, with which it shares analytic or 
contextual implications” (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 87).  
 
Contrary to Grice’s (1989) position, Wilson and Sperber contend that non-literalness is 
not to be handled as a case of violating the maxim of truthfulness. In fact, there is 
nothing to distinguish metaphor, irony, impersonations or jokes from serious, literal 
cases. In this sense, the notion of literalness is to be understood in terms of interpretive 
resemblance.  
Moreover, interpretive resemblance is said to be a matter of degree. At one extreme 
reside utterances that bear no resemblance to each other (they may not share analytic or 
contextual implications). On the other side, we have full identity of analytic or 
contextual implications. We learn, then, that  
 
When a thought or utterance P is interpretively used to represent another thought or utterance Q, 
P is a literal interpretation of Q if and only if P and Q share all their implications. Literalness, so 
defined, is just a special case of interpretive resemblance (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 87). 
 
To the extent that all the aforementioned utterances of cause are used procedurally, 
in terms of inferential steps required for interpretation, they are also seen as non-literal 
instances of loose talk and are to be treated as such3. For Sperber and Wilson 
(1986/1995), loose talk is a case of interpretive use, rather than a case of departure from 
some communicative norm. In this respect, the expectation that is crucial to 
communication here is one not of truthfulness but of optimal relevance.  
For the record,  
 
[…] an optimally relevant utterance is one that communicates enough contextual implications to 
be worth the hearer’s attention, and puts the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in obtaining them 
(Wilson and Sperber 1988: 87). 
   
Given the fact that verbal communication under-specifies the speaker’s informative 
intention, on the one hand, and that pragmatic input spares us the unjustifiable mental 
effort of processing wastefully explicit talk, the speaker here is taken to communicate a 
subset of the total analytic and contextual implications (recoverable in contextual 
assumptions), which is, however, rich enough to be worth the hearer’s attention. No 
other utterance would have been more economical and easier for the speaker to produce.       
Moreover, interpretive uses are taken to constitute attributive interpretations, in that 
the speaker attributes an utterance to the hearer not only to report it, but also to express 
an attitude to it. In this respect, the previous cases of, say, direct quotation or paraphrase 
                                                 
3 Insofar as literal meaning is a matter of degree, the non-literal type of encoding proposed in this paper is 
to be regarded as contributing to the explicit rather than implicit side of communication.  
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or translation, are special cases of attributive or ‘echoic’ use (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995).  
Arguably, the issue of what was formerly conceived of as metacommunicative 
expression can be further characterized by recourse to echoicness. We know from 
Wilson and Sperber (1998) and Carston (2002) that echoic utterances do not necessarily 
involve a response to a previous utterance. Rather, they may attribute a though, as is the 
case, for instance, with metaconceptual negation (Carston 2002: 297):  
 
(15) A: Their contributions were important. 
B: Right, but YOUR contributions were not important, they were invaluable. 
[Carston 2002: 297]    
 
In this sense, a representation is used echoically when it attributes some aspect of 
form or content to someone other than the conversationalist at that moment and 
expresses an attitude to it.  
In this line of speculation, and on the production rather than comprehension side of 
communication, examples (1) and (6) – (9) may be earmarked as attributive or echoic, 
metaconceptual uses of cause. Notably, attribution of though but also the expression of 
attitude can be either overt (encoded) or tacit. (Wilson and Sperber 1988, Carston 2002). 
It seems to us that the attribution of thought in metaconceptual causality is on the tacit 
side.  
An analysis of these data suggests a standard principle of explication: the speaker 
attributes to the audience the thought that they need to obtain a piece of information 
required for the successful process of an utterance as a whole, and does so implicitly. 
This type of metarepresentation is conveyed along with a covertly communicated 
attitude to the thought attributed.       
For example, in (1) the speaker appears to attribute to the audience the thought that 
they missed preceding information, i.e. the information expressed in the respective 
utterance of the main clause. Moreover, the attribution is achieved along with the tacit 
communication of the attitude of realization that a repetition of the information is 
required. The interpretation of (6) works similarly, in that the speaker recognizes that 
the audience lacks an essential chunk of knowledge. On the other hand, the thought 
entertained echoically in favour of the audience in (7) is that they wonder about the 
speaker’s conduct. (8) and (9) are instances of the speaker attributing the thought of 
inadequate contextual information (regarding the use of lexical concepts such as killing 
or friend) and realizing the requirement for making up for it.  
It is fathomable that attributive representation reflects an appropriate construal of the 
modal (epistemic and non-declarative) cases as well (3, 4) along similar lines of 
argumentation, although making this claim would involve an enterprise that is not of 
our present concern.   
In addition, instances of linguistic under-determinacy also seem amenable to the 
qualifications of metaconceptual cause proposed. In this sense, the speaker makes 
provisions for information retrieval by way of conjunctive encoding, as in (10) or (11), 
in favour of the addressee delivering base-order explicatures. These cases are closer to 
the end of explicitness than all the previous ones, in that such utterances do not 
represent cases of recovering intentional attitudes. However, this comes as no surprise 
given that interpretive resemblance or literalness is ultimately a matter of degree.  
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9. Conclusions  
To recapitulate our discussion, we concluded that the notion of metacommunicative 
causality is neither necessary nor sufficient for the description of causal data treated as 
cases of the putative category of meaning. Moreover, the meaning description of so-
called metacommunicative cause can be readily accommodated for along the relevance-
oriented qualifications of procedural encoding and interpretive meaning. The advantage 
of this approach is a uniform and economical method of pragmatic survey that warrants 
a coherent analysis of a range of causal applications.  
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